GCC-Syria Relations
and Implications for the EU

In recent years, several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been re-evaluating their relationship with Syria. Initially, as the 2011 civil war erupted, the GCC was, more or less, united in supporting the international coalition against Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad regime. However, they now retain divergent positions as several have come to support the rehabilitation of Assad —whether through more private, lower-level channels or publicly. It follows a regional trend, with countries recalculating how to best promote their national interests and maintain regional stability as Assad appears to be firmly in control of the country — mainly due to the support of Russia and Iran — and as the US continues its pivot towards Asia.

 

A Spectrum of Engagement with Syria

 

The most salient example of this trend is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). After restoring diplomatic relations with Syria in 2018, the Emirates have made bold strides in normalisation efforts. President of the UAE, Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, and Vice President, Prime Minister, and Ruler of Dubai, Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, welcomed Assad in March 2022 on his first visit to an Arab country since the beginning of the war—following UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan’s visit to Damascus in November 2021.[i] The UAE has also become an advocate for reinstating Syria to the Arab League, calling for ‘Syria’s return to the Arab fold’ on the basis that a regional approach is needed to solve the conflict.[ii] This comes as the UAE sees an opening to gain a foothold in the country and expand its influence to notably curb Tehran’s hold on Assad. Besides, there are lucrative economic opportunities that exist in Syria’s reconstruction that Abu Dhabi has been and is eager to take advantage of. Indeed, the UAE is Syria’s most prominent trade partner.[iii] For its part, Bahrain too re-established relations with Syria in 2018 and appointed an ambassador to the country in December 2021, citing support for Damascus’ sovereignty and preventing regional interference in its internal affairs.[iv]

 

Oman alike maintains diplomatic relations with Syria – although in distinct ways from Bahrain and the UAE because the Sultanate never broke off relations with Syria, continuing to engage with the country even at the height of the war in 2015 when Oman’s Foreign Minister visited Damascus to meet Assad.[v] And it was the first Gulf country to return its ambassador to Syria in 2020.[vi] This was reflective of Muscat’s attempts to assume a mediator’s role in the region in line with its non-interference and pragmatic foreign policy that supports engagement and dialogue over isolation.

 

Kuwait, on the other hand, whose foreign policy strikes some resemblance to Oman’s vis-à-vis its emphasis on dialogue and mediation, has been more hesitant to re-engage with Syria. It continues to state that it will not re-establish ties with Damascus unless the Arab League alters its stance on Syria.[vii] This too is not unexpected; not only is multilateralism a key tenet of Kuwait’s foreign policy but so are its humanitarian activities.[viii] Hence, a middle ground may allow the country to avoid international criticism while not closing off future relations with Syria.

 

In contrast, Saudi Arabia and particularly Qatar have more vehemently opposed Syria’s reinstatement into the Arab fold. The former has continued to publicly speak out against Syria with the Saudi representative to the UN, Abdullah Al-Mouallimi, delivering a scathing speech in reference to Syria at the UN in December 2021.[ix] However, privately, there has been more recent engagement in intelligence and economic matters, such as Syrian Minister of Tourism Rami Radwan Martini travelling to Saudi Arabia in May 2021 for a tourism conference.[x] Thus, the Kingdom may be testing the water for future diplomatic engagement as Riyadh will not want to be left out of the regional shift and new opportunities. Qatar has made no such move and continues to rule out normalisation with Syria — with no political or public desire to do so — remaining in line with its allies in the West and Turkey.[xi]

 

What Does This Mean for the EU?

 

Such a regional shift, however, has not spilled over to the West. The European Union (EU) continues to oppose any normalisation.[xii] Hence, the Gulf’s warming to Syria has undoubtedly raised eyebrows in Brussels though this should be tempered by the fact that the EU has renewed its interest in the Gulf, hoping to deepen cooperation on a number of files to promote regional and trans-regional stability, including in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, stabilising energy markets and Syria.[xiii] In that respect, the two sides continue to work together on Syria’s humanitarian situation, participating in several donor conferences in Brussels and Kuwait, in an effort to promote peace and stability.[xiv]

 

What does the Future Hold?

 

It is likely that the current trajectory of Gulf reengagement will only grow in the future. With Assad seemingly there to stay and Syria no longer being a US priority, Gulf countries have an opportunity to strengthen their position in Syria and benefit from economic opportunities available in the country’s reconstruction. That said, Syria is still far from full re-integration into the Arab fold with a lack of consensus on Assad, including from regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia. And, the West continues to disapprove of any normalisation, with, notably, the US Caesar Sanctions — that prevent anyone or country from doing business with Syria — still in place. Only time will tell what is in store for Assad; however, it is clear that the Gulf is seeking a more regional approach to address the conflict and promote peace and stability.

 

11 July 2022

​

References

 

[i] Emirates News Agency (WAM), ‘Mohamed bin Zayed receives President of Syria,’ WAM, March 19, 2022. https://wam.ae/en/details/1395303031349; WAM, ‘Syrian President receives Abdullah bin Zayed in Damascus,’ WAM, November 9, 2021. https://wam.ae/en/details/1395302990882.

[ii] WAM, ‘Emirati-Russian relations are profound, growing steadily: Abdullah bin Zayed,’ WAM, March 9, 2021. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302916733.

[iii] Ministry of Economy, Twitter post, October 10, 2021, 7:01pm. https://twitter.com/Economyae/status/1447260961711083525?s=20&t=qPi_MyYwExPbM2jG2-eXNA.

[iv] Bahrain News Agency (BNA), ‘HM King issues Decree 124/2021, appointing Bahraini Ambassador to Syria,’ BNA, December 30, 2021. https://www.bna.bh/en/HMKingissuesDecree1242021appointingBahrainiAmbassadortoSyria.aspx?cms=q8FmFJgiscL2fwIzON1%2BDpPQU6SYGygyiaRfp3mFMQU%3D; BNA, ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Work continues at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrain in Syria,’ BNA, December 28, 2018. https://www.bna.bh/ForeignMinistryWorkcontinuingatBahrainsembassyinSyria.aspx?cms=q8FmFJgiscL2fwIzON1%2bDpJd6bmSnJozVZTwMRmdYPU%3d.

[v] SANA, ‘President al-Assad receives Oman’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi,’ SANA, October 26, 2015. https://www.sanasyria.org/en/?p=59249.

[vi] Oman News Agency (ONA), ‘Al-Moallem receives credentials of new Ambassador of Oman Sultanate,’ ONA, October 4, 2020. http://www.sana.sy/en/?p=204925.

[vii] Reuters, ‘Kuwait expects more Arab countries to reopen embassies in Damascus: KUNA,’ Reuters, December 31, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kuwait-idUSKCN1OU0VP.

[viii] Kuwait received the honorary award of ‘Exemplary Humanitarian Leadership’ from the UN in 2014. See: https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sgsm16132.doc.htm.

[ix] The Syrian Observer, ‘Assad Regime Attacks Saudi Envoy who Said “Don’t Believe them”,’ The Syrian Observer, December 24, 2021. https://syrianobserver.com/news/72271/assad-regime-attacks-saudi-envoy-who-said-dont-believe-them.html.

[x] Reuters, ‘Syria says efforts ongoing to improve relations with Saudi - local radio,’ Reuters, May 26, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-efforts-ongoing-improve-relations-with-saudi-local-radio-2021-05-26/.

[xi] Zachary Basu, ‘Interview: Qatar's FM rules out normalization with Israel, Syria,’ Axios, February 2, 2022. https://www.axios.com/2022/02/02/qatar-rules-normalization-with-israel-syria.

[xii] Josep Borrell, Foreign Affairs Council, Council of the European Union, January 24, 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/53947/final-background-note-fac-24-jan-2022.pdf.

[xiii] European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (Brussels: European Union, 2022).

[xiv] EEAS, ‘Brussels VI Conference "Supporting the future of Syria and the region",’ EEAS, n.d. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/brussels-vi-conference-supporting-future-syria-and-region_en; UN, ‘Donors pledge $3.8 billion in aid to people affected by Syria crisis at UN-backed conference,’ UN News, March 31, 2015. https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/03/494772-donors-pledge-38-billion-aid-people-affected-syria-crisis-un-backed-conference.